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The Future of the Antiquities Act
James R. Rasband"
When President Roosevelt used the Antiquities Act' in 1943 to set aside
Jackson Hole National Monument,2 there was a firestorm of protest. But, seven
years later Congress added the monument lands to the Grand Teton National
Park,3 albeit with an amendment to the Antiquities Act prohibiting any additional
monument designations in Wyoming.4 Likewise, when President Johnson in
January of 1969, just ninety minutes before he was to leave office, signed
Antiquities Act proclamations adding some 264,000 acres to Arches5 and Capitol
Reef National Monuments, 6 the reaction in Utah was outrage. Senator Wallace
Bennett's criticism was illustrative. He protested that the proclamations were a
"last gasp attempt to embalm a little more land in the West," and were "unilateral
...with no notice whatsoever, without hearing any interested group, without
prior consultation with Congress and without consultation or discussion with
state officials."7 But when the Federal Land Policy Management Act (FLPMA)8
was debated and passed only seven years later in 1976, there was nary a word
about the Antiquities Act. Indeed, although FLPMA specifically eliminated
several sources of executive withdrawal authority, it left the Antiquities Act
untouched.
Given this history, it seems legitimate to ask whether anyone will be as
concerned about the Antiquities Act twenty years from now. Will all of the
concerns about the Clinton administration's use of the Antiquities Act simply
fade into history? Twenty years from now will anyone care that the Grand
Staircase and other landscape monuments 9 were set aside with little, if any, public

Associate Professor of Law, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University.
The Antiquities Act of 1906, Pub. L. No. 209, 34 Stat. 225 (1906) (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§
431-433).
2 Exec. Procl. 2578, 57 Stat. 731 (1943).

Pub. L. No. 81-787, 64 Stat. 849 (1950).
16 U.S.C. § 431(a) (1994).
sExec. Procl. 3887, 83 Stat. 920 (1969).
6 Exec. Procl. 3888, 83 Stat. 922 (1969).
Gordon Elliot White, Hearings Due on Land Plan, Deseret News BI (Jan. 22, 1969); Bennett
Blasts LBJ 'Land Grab' to Expand 2 Monuments in Utah, Salt Lake Trib. § 2 at 17 (Jan. 22, 1969).
' Pub. L. 94-579, 90 Stat. 2743 (1976) (codified at 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1784).
9 President Clinton has proclaimed ten monuments. See Grand Staircase-EscalanteNational
Monument, Exec. Procl. 6920, 3 C.F.R. 64 (Sept. 24, 1996) (withdrawing approximately 1.7 million acres);
Grand Canyon-ParashantNational Monument, Exec. Prod. 7265, 65 Fed. Reg. 2825 (Jan. 11, 2000)
(withdrawing approximately 1,014,000 acres in northern Arizona adjacent to Grand Canyon National Park);
California Coastal NationalMonument, Exec. Procl. 7264, 65 Fed. Reg. 2821 (Jan. 11, 2000) (withdrawing
thousands of small islands, rocks, and reefs off the coast of California); Agua FriaNational Monument, Exec.
4
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participation and by a process so lacking in the procedural protections afforded
elsewhere in natural resource law that even admirers of the monuments admit to
some discomfort? To give an affirmative answer to these queries would seem to
be blind optimism. If history is any guide, it seems most likely that twenty, or
even ten, years from now most will look out upon the dramatic western
landscapes that have been set aside and be grateful. The dubious means of their
designation will be unknown and forgotten to all but a few and the Antiquities
Act will return to the president's shelf and be a subject of discussion primarily
among law professors who teach in the public lands area.
Why is it that presidential use of the Antiquities Act triggers over and
over the same concern about procedural fairness and yet the act has still not been
repealed or amended? One part of the answer is clear; a vast majority like the
results and thus any squeamishness about the means is rather quickly forgotten.
The public preference for preserving natural wonders is not new, but it has
increased dramatically in the last forty years. Between 1950 and 1999, recreation
visits to national forest system lands went from 27.4 million to over 287 million;' 0
and total visitor days on BLM lands climbed from 31,170,000 in 1972 to
65,657,000 in 1999." As Jan Laitos at the University of Denver law school has
suggested, recreation and preservation are now the dominant uses of the public
lands.' 2 Hal Rothman, an environmental historian at the University of Nevada at
Las Vegas, states this same conclusion more bluntly:

Procl. 7263, 65 Fed. Reg. 2817 (Jan. 11,2000) (withdrawing approximately 71,000 acres of mesas and canyons
near Flagstaff, Arizona); Giant Sequoia NationalMonument, Exec. Procl. 7295, 65 Fed. Reg. 24095 (Apr. 15,
2000) (withdrawing approximately 38,000 acres of the Sequoia National Forest in California); Canyons of the
Ancients National Monument, Exec. Prod. 7317, 65 Fed. Reg. 37243 (June 9, 2000) (withdrawing
approximately 164,000 acres in the Four Corners region of southwest Colorado); Cascade Siskiyou National
Monument, Exec. Prod. 7318, 65 Fed. Reg. 37249 (June 9, 2000) (withdrawing approximately 52,000 acres
of the Cascade Range along the Oregon-California border); Hanford Reach National Monument, Exec. Procl.
7319, 65 Fed. Reg. 37253 (June 9, 2000) (withdrawing approximately 195,000 acres in southeast Washington
along the Columbia River); IronwoodForestNationalMonument, Exec. Procl. 7320,65 Fed. Reg. 37259 (June
9, 2000) (withdrawing approximately 129,000 acres in the Sonoran Desert northwest of Tucson). President
Clinton also created the PresidentLincoln and Soldiers' Home National Monument (Armed Forces Retirement
Home), Exec. Prod. 7329, 65 Fed. Reg. 43673 (July 7, 2000) (classic 2.3 acre designation), and enlarged the
boundaries of the PinnaclesNationalMonument in California, Exec. Procl. 7266, 65 Fed. Reg. 2831 (June 9,
2000) (withdrawing approximately 8,000 additional acres).
0 Charles I. Zinser, OutdoorRecreation: United States National Parks,Forests, & Public Lands
301 (John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 1995).
1 Bureau of Land Management, Public Land Statistics (1999) (available at
<http://www.blm.gov:80/natacq/pls99/99p14-I.pdf>). For a more thorough discussion of the growth of
recreation on the public lands and its implications for public lands policy, see James R. Rasband, The Rise of
Urban Archipelagoes
in the American West: A New Reservation Policy?, 31 Envtl. L. 1, 24-27 (2001).
'2 Jan G. Laitos & Thomas A. Cart, The Transformation of PublicLands, 26 Ecology L.Q. 140, 144
(1999).
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FUTURE OF THE ANTIQUITIES ACT
The truth is hard, but clear. The rural West has become a playground,
a colony the rest of us visit when we want to relax or indulge our
fantasies. We camp, hike, swim, boat, bike, ski, hunt, fish and ATV
throughout the rural West, making our living, and lives
in its
13
increasingly stretched out and stunningly dense cities ....

Alongside and partly because of this increasing public preference for
preservation and recreation, the West has experienced a population boom. 4 The
influx has occurred largely in the cities of the West, and the suburban and
exurban areas that surround them, resulting in a number of "urban
archipelagoes,"'' 5 the name given by demographers to places like Colorado's
Front Range and Utah's Wasatch Front, which are areas of high population
density surrounded by rural areas with declining populations.6
Any speculation about the future of the Antiquities Act must take account
of both this altered demographic and the increasing public preference for
recreation and preservation. With an eye toward that changing social context, this
essay hazards a few guesses about what the future of the act will be, and then
optimistically suggests what the future of the act should be.
I. THE NEAR-TERM FUTURE OF THE ANTIQUITIES ACT

In the immediate aftermath of the Grand Staircase-Escalante National
Monument (Monument) proclamation and Secretary of Interior Bruce Babbitt's
assurances of a more open process in the future, 7 one might have been tempted
to predict that change was ahead for the Antiquities Act, that stung by the wide
criticism of its approach, the administration would agree that local participation
was critical to a fair withdrawal process. To the extent one had such a hope, it has
proved largely unfounded. Admittedly, since the Monument proclamation,
Secretary Babbitt has done more to allow local citizens and local governments to
comment upon potential designations, probably more than has been done by any
previous administration seeking to use the Antiquities Act.'" Unfortunately,

13Hal Rothman, Do We Really Need the Rural West?, 32 High Country News 17 (Apr. 24, 2000).
14A. Dan Tarlock & Sarah B. Van de Wetering, Growth Management & Western Water Law: From
Urban Oasis
to Archipelagoes,5 Hastings W.-N.W. J.Envtl. L. & Policy 163 (1999).
15

Id.

16

d. at 165.
17See Steve DiMeglio, Clinton Looks West in Search of a Legacy, Gannett News Serv. (May 29,
2000) (available in 2000 WL 4400274) (quoting Secretary Babbitt: "What I've said to everybody in the West
after Escalante is that it won't happen again on my watch").
i8 Secretary Babbitt, for example, did allow Representative Mary Bono and local officials to develop
a proposal for a new national monument in the Santa Rosa and San Jacinto mountains of southern California.
See Jacqueline Newmyer, House OKs Palm Springs-areaNational PreserveEnvironment: Developers and
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it is still the case that the approach has not been collaborative in any real
sense. The administration announces its intentions and invites the affected state
and community to develop legislation that meets the administration's objectives.
If the legislation is not to its liking or is too slow in developing, the monument
is simply declared.' 9
For the immediate future, this sort of illusory participation seems to be
the primary "change" triggered by the Monument designation. It is not, of course,
a real or lasting change to the Antiquities Act. Indeed, when it comes to amending
the act, the administration has adamantly opposed every effort to include
procedural protections, including the most tepid of participation obligations. It
has even threatened to veto House Bill (H.R.) 1487 which would amend the
Antiquities Act to require the president to "solicit public participation and
comment" but only "to the extent consistent with" achieving the protective
purposes of the act.20 It also requires the president to "consult with the Governor

Outdoors Activists Both Worked to Set Aside 272,000 MountainAcres, Senate and AdministrationApproval
Is Also Expected, L.A. Times A4 (July 26, 2000) (reporting on this agreement). The House has passed the bill
and Senate approval awaits. See id. The president, however, has promised to designate a monument if the bill
is not passed this session. See Jennifer Bowles, Inland EnvironmentalistsNot All Gore Enthusiasts:He May
Face Protestsfrom Erstwhile Allies When the Democrats Meet Next Week, The Press-Enterprise A9 (Aug. 9,
2000) (reporting the President's vow). A similar approach is illustrated by Colorado Representative Scott
Mclnnis's bill to create Colorado Canyons National Conservation Area. The bill, which proposes protection for
some 200,000 acres along the Colorado-Utah line near Grand Junction, resulted from compromises with the
Interior Department and has also passed the House and only needs Senate approval. See House OK's
PreservationMeasure, Salt Lake Trib. A7 (July 26, 2000) (discussing this legislation). Similar legislation has
been developed for Steens Mountain in Oregon. See H.R. Subcomm. on Natl. Parks & Pub. Lands, Hearingon
H.R.4828, Steens MountainCooperativeManagementand ProtectionArea (July 18, 2000) (available in 2000
WL 23831475) (statement of Molly McUsic, counselor to the secretary) (promising administration support if
"important modifications are made").
" See H.R. Subcomm. on Natil. Parks & Public Lands, Hearing on Shivwits Plateau and Utah
Wilderness (Oct. 19, 1999) (available in 1999 WL 992693 (testimony of Sec. Babbitt) (vowing no more
surprises, but emphasizing that he will only support legislation "that I think is reasonable, and that meets up to
the objectives of this administration") and (statement of Ariz. Rep. Bob Stump) (expressing efforts to craft a
plan with local input and testimony of Secretary Babbitt rejecting the proposal as inadequate); Sen. Comm. on
Energy & Nat. Resources, Hearingson Energy Costs and Foreign Dependency (June 15, 2000) (statement of
Sen. Ben Knighthorse Campbell) (observing that the "public process" prior to the designation of the Canyons
of the Ancients National Monument consisted only of his opportunity to first introduce a bill proposing to
withdraw the land the secretary promised to designate).
20Compare H.R. 1487, 106th Cong. (1999) Senate Energy Committee Approves Weaker Version
of Monument Bill, Inside Energy/with Fed. Lands 14 (Oct. 25, 1999) (available in 1999 WL 12810767) ("An
Interior Dept. spokesman has said his department would recommend Clinton veto even the House bill as a
restriction on presidential powers.") with H.R. Subcomm. on Nati. Parks & Pub. Lands, Hearingon H.R. 1487
(June 17, 1999) (available in 1999 WL 20009065) (statement of John D. Leshy) (opposing earlier version of
H.R. 1487 which included requirement that an environmental impact statement be prepared). The administration
has also opposed other efforts to amend the Antiquities Act, albeit ones with more significant limitations on
executive power. Compare also H.R. 1127, 105th Cong. (1997) (requiring congressional approval and
comments from the appropriate governor before designation of a national monument in excess of 5,000 acres);
S.477, 105th Cong. (1997) (containing the same language as H.R. 1127, 105th Cong. (1997)); S. 62, 105th
Cong. (1997) (requiring an act of Congress and public participation before extending or establishing a national
monument in Idaho); and S.691, 105th Cong. (1997) (requiring an act of Congress and public participation
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and congressional delegation of the State... in which the lands are located," but
only "to the extent practicable."'" H.R. 1487 is so watered-down as to be almost
meaningless. In fact, evidence of just how meaningless is indicated by the House
vote of 408-2 in favor.22 Yet even this almost plaintive request is threatened with
a veto. That veto threat says everything one needs to know about the future of
participation and the likelihood of any meaningful amendment of the Antiquities
Act for the remainder of the current administration.
Speculating about the chances for genuine local participation for the
remainder of the current administration would not be particularly interesting if
the president were not expected to declare any more monuments, but he almost
surely will. Just last month Secretary Babbitt recommended a 661,000 acre
addition to the Craters of the Moon National Monument in Idaho and that
293,000 acres in northern Arizona be set aside as the Vermillion Cliffs National
Monument. 23 Likewise, under pressure from the administration, Congress has
been moving to protect the Santa Rosa and San Jacinto mountains in California,
Steens Mountain in Oregon, and the Colorado Canyons area near Grand
Junction.24 If that legislation fails, those areas are also likely to be proclaimed
monuments. The Carrizo Plain in California's Central Valley and the Missouri
Breaks area have also been identified as areas under consideration for
monuments. 25 Last month it was reported that at the Democrats' recent
convention, Secretary Babbitt told the Utah delegation that he would work only
on known proposals until the end of his term.26 Although this report suggests that
only the above-mentioned areas are monument possibilities, it is difficult to know
precisely what Secretary Babbitt's reference to known proposals meant because
he has refused to provide a definitive list of potential monuments. Perhaps the

before designation of any national monument), with Sen. Subcomm. on Natl. Parks, Historic Preservation, &
Recreation (Feb. 12, 1998) (available in 1998 WL 61440) (statement of John D. Leshy) (testifying against all
three bills and opposing "new formal procedural requirements for notice, consultation and Congressional action"
on the grounds that it would "increase the incentive to rush to establish rights or exploit resources that could
irreparably harm the features and values to be preserved"). Among other attempts to amend the Antiquities Act
which did not receive the support of the administration are S. 729, 106th Cong. (1999) (requiring public
participation, survey of resource values, and approval by act of Congress) and H.R. 4121, 106th Cong. (2000)
(prohibiting any president from designating more than one national monument and requiring congressional
approval within two years for the designation to become effective).
21H.R. 1487, 106th Cong. § B (1999).
22Thomas, a service of the Library of Congress, Bill Summary and Status for 106th Congress,
<http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-binlbdquery/z?d106:HR01487:@ @@x> (accessed Mar. 14, 2001).
23See Babbitt Recommends Two New Monuments, Pub. Lands News 5-6 (Aug. 18, 2000).
24See supra n. 18 (discussing this legislation).
25See Charles Levendowsky, NationalMonuments: DespiteObjectionsin the West, MostAmericans
Support Designations, Desert News AA01 (Feb. 6, 2000) (discussing these two and other areas under
consideration for national monument status).
' No Surprise Monuments, Utah Delegates Promised,Salt Lake Trib. A10 (Aug. 15, 2000).
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most interesting question is whether the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge falls
outside his reference to known proposals.
Aside from speculating on specific areas to be designated, predicting the
near-term future of the Antiquities Act does not seem particularly difficult. The
act is likely to remain unamended and aggressively employed, and local
participation will remain minimal and largely illusory.
1. THE ANTIQUITIES AcT iN THE NEXT ADMINISTRATION
Perhaps the more interesting question in the midst of the presidential
campaign is what will happen to the Antiquities Act in the next administration.
If Vice-President Gore is elected, it is hard to know whether the act will be such
a centerpiece of his public lands policies. He has certainly been supportive of
President Clinton's proclamations and thus it seems a bit optimistic to conclude
that he would be more amenable to adding procedural protections to the act. If
Governor Bush is elected, however, the potential for change is significantly
increased. If he were elected and if the Republicans maintained control of
Congress, there is a possibility that the Antiquities Act would be repealed or at
least amended to require additional participation. Governor Bush has suggested
on a number of occasions that greater local participation in monument decisions
is important. And the Republican platform (admittedly not a blueprint for policy
in the Bush administration) promises to actively involve Congress and affected
states and local communities in monument decisions.27 Nevertheless, if the
Antiquities Act issue is not taken up early in a Bush administration, history
suggests that the issue might not be taken up at all. Legislators will get little
credit for fixing an act that is unlikely to be put to significant use during a Bush
administration, and will thus have little reason to sacrifice much else on their
legislative agendas.
UTl. THE POWER TO REVOKE OR DIMINISH NATIONAL MONUMENTS
A. PresidentialPower to Revoke or DiminishNational Monuments
The impact of a Bush presidency on the Antiquities Act was recently
made more intriguing because of comments made by his vice-presidential
nominee, Dick Cheney. Although Cheney was careful to note that he was not

27 Republican Party Platform (adopted July 2000), American Partners in Conservation and
Preservation: Stewardship of Our Natural Resources, Public Lands for the Public Good
<http://ucsub.colorado.edu/-curepub/platformlresources.html#property> (accessed Mar. 16, 2001).
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speaking for Governor Bush, he suggested that President Clinton's monument
decisions would be reviewed, presumably with an eye toward rescinding or
diminishing some of the monuments.28 Cheney's remarks raise interesting
questions about whether a president would have the power to accomplish that
result. Before delving into this question, however, it is worth noting how unlikely
it is, as a practical matter, that a President Bush would choose to revoke existing
monuments. Like any good politician, he would surely be aware that, even in the
western states, the majority of voters will be reluctant to shift public lands from
the preservation and recreation category back to the extractive use category.
Could a President Bush unilaterally, and without congressional
participation, revoke the monuments established by President Clinton? Any
revocation of an existing monument would surely be subjected to an immediate
legal challenge. My guess is that the challenge would be successful. Although
presidents clearly have the power to revoke executive orders issued pursuant to
their Article II executive powers,2 9 when a president proclaims a national
monument, he is not exercising authority vested in the executive branch. He is
acting pursuant to powers delegated to him by Congress in the Antiquities Act.
Accordingly, whether a president may revoke a national monument depends on
whether Congress intended the president to have that power. On its face, the
Antiquities Act does not appear to be a two-way delegation. It expressly delegates
to the president authority to "declare" a national monument and to "reserve" the
land necessary to care for and manage that monument,3 ° but says nothing about
a president's authority to revoke an existing monument.
Because there is no express delegation, a president would need to prove
that a power to revoke can be implied from the language of the act or can be
derived from some inherent executive authority over the public lands. The
Supreme Court has never suggested that the president has inherent withdrawal
authority. Although it is conceivable that a president could cobble together some
sort of argument for inherent authority over the public lands for military
purposes, it is hard to imagine a court recognizing inherent executive authority
to revoke or create a national landscape monument. Courts, however, have been
willing in some instances to recognize an implied power to revoke a prior
withdrawal. Executive order Indian reservations, for example, were often
eliminated or reduced in size by unilateral presidential action, at least until
Congress legislated to prohibit such boundary changes. 3 The major difference in
those cases, however, is that the executive power to create the reservation had

' Cheney Says Monuments Could be Rescinded, Salt Lake Trib. AI (August 25, 2000).
29U.S. Const. art. II.
'G16 U.S.C. § 431.
31 U.S. v. S. P. Transp. Co., 543 F.2d 676, 686-87 (9th Cir. 1976).
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also been implied. Indeed, the power to create the reservations had not even been
implied from a statute, as has arguably been the case with the broad construction
given to the Antiquities Act, but from long congressional silence and
acquiescence to prior executive order Indian reservations.3 2 It thus appears that
if a withdrawal is accomplished by executive authority implied from
congressional silence, a court will be more willing to recognize implied authority
in the executive to undo what it has already done. The Antiquities Act, however,
gives only express withdrawal authority and gives no authority to revoke. It thus
seems logical that a court would be much more reluctant to find implied authority
to revoke a proclamation issued pursuant to a specific congressional directive.
This logic is confirmed in part by how Congress, in FLPMA, handled the
secretary of the interior's power to revoke or modify prior withdrawals. FLPMA
gave the secretary fifteen years (until 1991) to modify or revoke certain previous
withdrawals.3 3 However, the act specifically provided that the secretary "shall not
...modify or revoke any withdrawal creating national monuments under the
[Antiquities Act]". 34 As one court noted, FLPMA's limitation on the secretary's
withdrawal power was designed to replicate the secretary's power prior to
FLPMA: the secretary, and presumably the president, could revoke withdrawals
made pursuant to implied executive authority, but not those withdrawals
accomplished by a specific act of Congress.3 5
Because a monument is a withdrawal accomplished by a specific act of
Congress, it seems likely that a court would deny a president the power to revoke
a prior national monument designation. This conclusion is necessarily tentative
because no judicial decision has addressed the issue. The only pronouncement on
the president's power to revoke a national monument is a 1938 attorney general
opinion which concluded that the Antiquities Act did not give a president
authority to revoke a prior monument proclamation. 36 Beyond this opinion, which
is of quite limited precedential value, there is an additional reason why a court
might be reluctant to recognize in the Antiquities Act an implied power to revoke.
In several other turn-of-the-century statutes delegating withdrawal power to the
president, Congress specifically included a provision allowing the president or
the secretary of the interior to revoke a prior withdrawal. For example, the Act
of June 25, 1910, commonly known as the Pickett Act, 37 gave the president
authority to "temporarily" withdraw public lands but also provided that those
32

1 d. at 686.

33 43 U.S.C. § 1714(l)(1).

' Id. § 1714(.).
35Pacific Legal Found. v. Watt, 529 F. Supp. 982, 998-99 (D. Mont. 1981).
' ProposedAbolishment of Castle Pinckney Nat'l Monument, 39 Op. Atty. Gen. 185, 187 (1938).
3736 Stat. 847 (1910) (codified at 43 U.S.C. § 141) (repealed by Pub. L. No. 94-579, § 704(a)
(1976)).
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withdrawals were to "remain in force until revoked by him or an Act of
Congress."3 8 Similar revocation provisions exist in the Carey Act of 1894,"9 and
the Reclamation Act of 1902. 40 If Congress understood the authority to withdraw
to contain the implied authority to revoke, the revocation permission in the
Pickett Act and these other statutes would have been mere surplusage. The
language of these acts indicates that Congress knew what to say if it wanted to
give the president authority to revoke one of his own withdrawals, and it did not
say it in the Antiquities Act.
Ultimately, the resolution of the revocation issue would turn on the
courts' view of executive power over the public lands and how closely the courts
choose to guard congressional prerogatives by narrowly construing delegations.
In this vein, any litigation challenging a monument revocation would present
some interesting ironies. On the one hand, those who now rely on inherent
executive authority, or more often, on congressional acquiescence and silence, to
support presidential use of the Antiquities Act that ranges far beyond its original
purpose of preserving archeological sites, would find themselves arguing that the
executive's power over the public lands is limited to express congressional
delegations. On the other hand, those, like Secretary Cheney, who decry the use
of the act as an end-run around Congress, would be supporting the president's
power to do precisely that. Indeed, if a court were to read into the Antiquities Act
presidential power to revoke a proclamation, it might prove a pyrrhic victory for
those who support revocation because it would suggest that the president has
some inherent power to withdraw public lands in the future.
Although the same reasoning that prohibits revocations would at first
glance seem to apply to reductions in monument size, both the Attorney General's
1938 Opinion, and a 1947 Interior Decision4 opined that a president has the
power to reduce the size of a monument because of the requirement in the
Antiquities Act that monuments be confined to "the smallest area compatible with
the proper care and management of the objects to be protected."4 2 Neither of these
sources explain their reasoning, but their view seems to be that this language
creates a continuing, as opposed to a one-time, duty to consider whether less
acreage would be sufficient to fulfill the act's protective purpose. Separating the
revocation question from the acreage-reduction question has support in the text
of the act. The act explicitly separates the power to designate "structures[] and
other objects" from the power to "reserve" the land necessary to protect the
3

8id.

39Ch. 301, § 4, 28 Stat. 422 (1894) (codified at 43 U.S.C. § 641).
4032 Stat. 388 (1902) (codified at 43 U.S.C. § 416).

4' National Monuments, 60 Int. Dec. 9 (1947).
42 16 U.S.C. § 431.
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objects.4 3 These two issues have largely been treated as one by the courts, in part
because in the case of the landscape monuments that have been challenged, the
land itself has been the primary object to be protected. Nevertheless, the courts
may be more willing to separate the object and acreage determinations where the
question is the president's power to revoke or diminish the size of an existing
monument.
In fact, there would be a certain symmetry to affording the executive
broader authority to diminish rather than revoke an existing monument. As
discussed above, presidents have traditionally had power to modify or revoke
prior executive withdrawals that were accomplished pursuant to authority implied
from congressional silence and acquiescence. Everyone who has studied the
legislative history of the Antiquities Act concedes that Congress did not intend
the act to authorize broad landscape-level withdrawals. The only potential
authority for such landscape monuments is the long-term congressional
acquiescence in such withdrawals which dates back to the presidency of
Theodore Roosevelt." Reducing the acreage of landscape monuments would thus
be akin to modifying a withdrawal based on implied executive authority rather
than on a specific act of Congress.
In the end, these fine distinctions between the power to revoke and the
power to reduce are likely to be purely academic. Even if a President Bush could
act to modify or revoke some of President Clinton's monument designations, the
political demographics suggest that he is extremely unlikely to do so. For this
same reason, it seems unlikely that a President Bush will propose cutting
appropriations for the management of existing monuments. This approach has
been employed by Congress in the past. Congress refused to fund the Jackson
Hole National Monument for seven years45 and denied funding to the Chesapeake
and Ohio (C&O) Canal National Monument in Washington, D.C. for almost ten
years.' More likely than such a frontal funding assault on the monuments, is the
possibility that a Bush Interior Department would employ some of the same sort
of foot-dragging practices employed by Secretary Babbitt on mineral

43 Id.

"Roosevelt promptly put the Antiquities Act to use to create the Devil's Tower National Monument
in September 1906. Exec. Procl. 658, 34 Stat. 3236 (1906). Soon thereafter he proclaimed the Grand Canyon
National Monument. Exec. Prod. 794, 35 Stat. 2175 (1908).
45James R. Rasband, Utah's Grand Staircase: The Right Path to Wilderness Preservation,70 U.
Colo. L. Rev. 483,502 n. 90 (1999) (discussing legislation prohibiting the Interior Department from spending
any funds to manage the Jackson Hole National Monument).
4See
Barry Mackintosh, C&O Canal: The Making of a Park 90-102 (U.S. Dept. of Int., History
Div. 1991) (discussing how Congress effectively denied funding and development of the C&O Canal National
Monument between January 18, 1961, the date of its proclamation by President Eisenhower, until January 8,
1971, when the monument became the C&O Canal National Historical Park).
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examinations."' Resources would simply be shifted within the department to
promote more development-oriented objectives.
B. SecretarialPower to Revoke or Diminish National Monuments
Just as Governor Bush, if elected President, would not likely be able to
rescind a prior monument designation, another interior secretary will also lack the
power to do so. No federal law gives the secretary power to modify or revoke
national monuments. Indeed, even during FLPMA's now-expired fifteen-year
window for modifying or revoking prior withdrawals, the secretary, as mentioned
above, was specifically prohibited from modifying or revoking any national
monument."8 This is not to say that a new interior secretary could not have any
impact on an existing monument. With respect to the Monument, for example, the
Bureau of Land Management (BLM) could make adjustments to its management
plan,"9 although the adjustments would probably be limited to those still intended
to accomplish the protective purposes of the proclamation.50

C. CongressionalPower to Revoke or Diminish NationalMonuments
Finally, there is no question of Congress' power to revoke or modify a
national monument designation. Congress has plenary power over the public
lands under the Property Clause5 ' and Congress has abolished a number of

47

lndep. Mining Co. v. Babbitt, 885 F. Supp. 1356, 1358-59 (D. Nevada 1995), affid 105 F.3d 502
(9th Cir. 1997) (discussing how Secretary Babbitt slowed the patent issuance process to a crawl by terminating
the practice of allowing miners to contract out the mineral examination process and then creating a byzantine
and inefficient process of secretarial review).
843 U.S.C. § 1714(j).
49
FLPMA provides that the secretary of the interior is to "develop, maintain, and, when appropriate,
revise land use plans ...for the use of the public lands,... regardless of whether such lands previously have
been classified, withdrawn, set aside, or otherwise designated for one or more uses." 43 U.S.C. § 1712(a). "The
term 'public lands' means any land ... administered by the Secretary of the Interior through the Bureau of Land
Management." Id. at § 1702(e). Thus, the Monument is still part of the "public lands" under FLPMA and the
secretary may revise the land use plan even if the land was "previously ...withdrawn" for another purpose. Id.
§ 1712(a).
soBecause the Monument is the first to be managed by the BLM, it is not entirely clear how the BLM
will interpret its management responsibilities. FLPMA requires the secretary of the interior to "manage the
public lands under principles of multiple use and sustained yield," but it also requires that where public land
"has been dedicated to specific uses according to any other provisions of law it shall be managed in accordance
with such law." 43 U.S.C. § 1732(a). The current management plan for the Monument provides that the
"Proclamation governs how the provisions of [FLPMA] will be applied within the Monument." Grand
Staircase-EscalanteNationalMonument Approved ManagementPlanRecord ofDecision 3 (U.S. Dept. of Int.,
Bureau of Land Mgt. 2000). Elsewhere, the plan provides that it was "prepared in accordance with" both the
proclamation and the land use planning requirements of FLPMA. Id. at vii, 3. The interesting question for the
future is how the BLM will implement the purposes of the proclamation within the framework of FLPMA.
5'U.S. Const. art IV, § 3, cl.
2.
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monuments in the past, although typically only to include the monument lands
within a national park instead.52 Accordingly, one final option open to a President
Bush would be to encourage Congress to rescind or modify one of the Clinton
monuments and then sign that legislation into law. Again, political realities
suggest that such a course is unlikely. As his election-year comments have
indicated, Governor Bush understands the political reality that monuments are
popular and that there are more votes to be had in the urban areas of the West
than in rural areas. This understanding would be unlikely to change if he were
elected.
IV. WHAT IF THE ANTIQUITIES ACT WERE REPEALED?
Although a President Bush would be unlikely to revoke existing
monuments, there is, as suggested above, a higher probability that he would
support repealing or amending the Antiquities Act. It would be somewhat
surprising if Congress actually voted to repeal the act altogether. But what if
Congress did? Would the sky fall? Would preservation stop? To listen to the
supporters of the Antiquities Act one might think so. But that would not be the
case.
Even without the Antiquities Act, presidents committed to conservation
could still accomplish their objectives. The fact is that FLPMA's withdrawal
provisions are wholly adequate to the preservation task and have the added
benefit of confirming a democratic and participatory approach to withdrawal
decisions.5 3 Although many supporters of the Antiquities Act believe in
participation, and even admit to being troubled by the lack of process protections
in the act, they remain willing to cast aside that principle because of the
significant preservation benefits achieved through the act. But it is not at all clear
that preserving our public lands actually requires such a sacrifice of principle.
The arguments that the Antiquities Act is indispensable are dubious. The
first claim that is almost always made with respect to the necessity of the act is
a historical one. Supporters point to important withdrawals like the Grand
Canyon and Jackson Hole and argue that they could not have been accomplished
without the act. 54 This argument is not necessarily wrong, it is just not

52See

Charles F. Wheatley, Jr., Study of WithdrawalsandReservations of PublicDomainLands 259

(unpublished study, rev. ed., Sept. 1969) (copy on file with U. of Utah Law Lib.); 16 U.S.C. § 406(d)(1)
(including Jackson National Monument within Grand Teton National Park).
s3 4 3 U.S.C. § 1714(c).
54 John D. Leshy, Putting the Antiquities Act into Perspective, in Visions of the GrandStaircaseEscalante, 83, 84-86 (Robert B. Keiter, Sarah B. George, & Joro Walker eds., Utah Museum of Nat. History
& Wallace Stegner Ctr. 1998).
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particularly relevant. Those withdrawals were made prior to FLPMA and thus
only beg the question whether FLPMA could accomplish the same task while
retaining process protections.
A second common argument in favor of the Antiquities Act is that the act
is critical because it allows the president to respond rapidly to emergency
situations where the public lands are threatened with irreparable harm. This is a
red herring. As a factual matter, it is difficult for the current administration to rely
on this emergency rationale. The president's proclamations were not triggered by
changes in public land uses that created an immediate threat. Mostly, what was
happening prior to the withdrawals was the same thing that had been happening
for years. Surely, emergent circumstances could arise, but the Antiquities Act is
not even necessary for a real emergency. FLPMA specifically allows the
secretary of the interior to make an emergency withdrawal of any amount of lands
for a period not to exceed three years. 5 Thus, in a real emergency, FLPMA
already allows circumvention of public participation.
Once the emergency rationale for the Antiquities Act is disposed of, the
real questions about the act's legitimacy come to the forefront. If FLPMA's
emergency provisions would give Congress three years to consider the threat to
the land, why should not Congress, which is charged by the Property Clause with
the management of the public lands, make the withdrawal decision? The answer
that supporters of the act give to this question is an interesting one. They could
just state the obvious: they do not want Congress to make the decision because
Congress might not favor the withdrawal. But this is not generally the argument
they make because it contains the implicit admission that a designation is
contrary to the will of the public's representatives in Congress. Supporters of the
act make a more sophisticated argument. They assert that the public and majority
in Congress would indeed support preservation legislation but that the majority's
will is thwarted by sharp legislative maneuvering, particularly the ability of longstanding committee chairmen from public lands states who have the ability to
bottle-up protective legislation in committee. 6 This frustration is legitimate and
reflects historical reality. That is precisely what led President Eisenhower to
declare the C&O Canal National Monument in Washington, D.C. and President
Roosevelt to declare the Jackson Hole National Monument.57 Moreover, given the
increasing public preference for recreation and preservation of the public lands,
it does indeed appear that a current and growing majority in Congress would
support greater preservation.

"s43U.S.C. § 1714(e).
5' Leshy, supra n. 54, at 86.
57id.
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Nevertheless, this legitimate concern is not a legitimate argument for the
necessity of the Antiquities Act because FLPMA was again designed to answer
this concern. FLPMA allows the secretary to make withdrawals of any acreage
for a period of up to twenty years unless Congress within ninety days rejects it
by a concurrent resolution.58 Moreover, FLPMA specifically prohibits the
committee to which the withdrawal is referred from bottling up the vote on the
resolution if any proponent demands a discharge of the withdrawal issue.59 Thus,
FLPMA provides a mechanism to circumvent committee roadblocks and actually
test Congress' support for the withdrawal. Although there are serious
constitutional questions about the validity of FLPMA' s legislative veto after the
Supreme Court's decision in Immigration and Naturalization Service v.
Chadha,W if the legislative veto were invalidated and held to be severable, the
secretary's FLPMA withdrawal authority would even be strengthened.
If FLPMA allows for withdrawals in emergent circumstances and allows
the secretary of the interior to demand an up-or-down congressional vote, why do
the act's supporters hold on so tenaciously? It is possible that they simply regard
as insufficient the twenty years of protection created by a secretarial withdrawal
under FLPMA and prefer the absence of a time limit under of the Antiquities Act.
But Antiquities Act withdrawals can themselves be overturned by Congress.
Moreover, if act supporters are correct, and they surely are, that even disputed
monuments quickly become national treasures, it is extremely unlikely that
Congress, after twenty years, would not finally ratify the withdrawal. Thus, the
distinction between a twenty-year withdrawal and a "permanent" one hardly
seems like a stirring reason for maintaining the act. More importantly, it is a
particularly weak reason for rejecting public participation in a monument's
creation. In the end, there is no legitimate reason for rejecting FLPMA's
withdrawal model, or, at very least, for not amending the Antiquities Act to create
similar process protections.
V. "CONQUEST BY CERTITUDE"

In his recent book, Fireon the Plateau,Charles Wilkinson contends that
many of the harms suffered by the Indian peoples and the lands of the Colorado
Plateau were a result of "a large body of people from Brigham Young to Nathan
Meeker to John Collier to Wayne Aspinall to Stewart Udall-men who knew to
an absolute certainty what was right for the Colorado Plateau."'" Professor
" 43 U.S.C. § 1714(c)(1).
59Id.
60 462
61

U.S. 919 (1983).
Charles F. Wilkinson, Fire on the Plateau: Conflict & Endurance in the American Southwest, 309
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Wilkinson concludes that the history of the American West has been one of
"conquest by certitude." His "conquest by certitude" thesis seems a largely
accurate characterization of public lands policy in the nineteenth century.
Confident in the moral, economic, and scientific wisdom of manifest destiny;
Americans were sure about what was the best use of the public lands and what
was best for the Indian tribes who dwelled there.62
The more interesting question is whether Professor Wilkinson's thesis
remains applicable today. Specifically, is aggressive use of the Antiquities Act
a repetition of this historical pattern of conquest by certitude? Should we be so
certain about the altruism and correctness of our new preservation preference that
we eschew any legal obligation to consult with those rural communities that have
developed real and lasting attachments to the public lands, at least in part because
of their reliance on public policies that encouraged that attachment? If so, we are
forgetting that our nineteenth century predecessors believed with just as much
conviction that settling and developing those lands was the right thing to do. How
much difference really exists between our motives and those of our nineteenth
century counterparts? Do we simply prefer different public lands amenities?
If our new public lands agenda runs the same risk of conquest by
certitude, what is the answer? Must preservation-minded withdrawals take a back
seat to natural resource extraction? Not necessarily. The solution is not to
abandon the preservation preference but to exhibit more skepticism about its
achievement. At a minimum, skepticism implies a willingness constantly to
question the necessary scope of our public lands aspirations and our means for
achieving them. In the withdrawal context, some of that questioning should be
directed at rural communities in the form of public participation requirements and
in the form of impact studies, both of which are components of the FLPMA
withdrawal process.6 3 These ideas of public participation and impact studies are
neither novel nor earth-shattering, except apparently in the case of the Antiquities
Act.
Indeed, before he became secretary of the interior, then-Arizona
Governor Babbitt argued that the federal government abused its power when it
denied local participation:
If President Reagan and Secretary Watt are serious about efforts to
establish a "good neighbor policy" between Washington and the West,
they should work to strengthen, not weaken, mechanisms for joint

(Island Press 1999).
62For a more thorough exposition of the implications of Professor Wilkinson's certitude thesis for
current public lands policy, see Rasband, supra n. 11, at 60-93.
6343 U.S.C. § 1714(c)(2).
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decisionmaking on public lands. In particular, the states must be given
a more meaningful role in planning development on federal lands within
their borders.... What angers most westerners is not the fact of federal
ownership, but the federal government's insistence that it is entitled to
exercise power "without limitation." When this sovereign power is
wielded by a continually changing parade of federal administrators,
64
each with a different agenda, the situation becomes intolerable.
Secretary Babbitt was right to criticize Secretary Watt for Watt's repeated endruns around Congress and state and local governments. Unfortunately, Secretary
Babbitt's use of the Antiquities Act has been more of the same.
Ultimately, the test for those of us who favor the new dominant uses of
preservation and recreation is whether this time we can exhibit less certitude and
more skepticism about our public lands preference by recognizing the interests
of the communities who are a part of the fabric of those lands. Amending or
repealing the Antiquities Act, and instead adhering to the FLPMA withdrawal
process, would be a good beginning.

" Bruce Babbitt, Federalism & the Environment: An Intergovernmental Perspective of the
SagebrushRebellion, 12 Envtl. L. 847, 857-58 (1982).

